The Paradox of Hedonism as a Means of Justification of Morality
The reported study was funded by RFBR, project number 20–011–00145 (Justification of Morality as a Problem of Contemporary Ethics (the Reconstruction, Comparison and Evaluation of Theoretical Approaches))
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.18413/2712-746X-2020-45-4-685-695Keywords:
morality, ethics, justification of morality, paradox of hedonism, Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, J. Butler, J.S. Mill, H. Sidgwick, P. Bloomfield, P. SingerAbstract
Justification of morality requires to find some arguments that can show a moral sceptic that to
carry out moral demands is necessary. Since a moral sceptic is usually understood as a hedonist,
justification of morality includes the demonstration of the contradictory nature of hedonism. One of the
often used methods of this demonstration is the appeal to the so-called ‘paradox of hedonism’. It states
that the desire to get maximum pleasure cannot possibly give us it while the desire to attain some other
goals can be much more productive in hedonistic terms. The author outlines the history of the paradox in
antiquity (Plato’s conception of ‘pure pleasures’, Aristotle’s understanding of pleasure as a ‘supervenient’ phenomenon, the epicurean teaching on friendship) and analyzes its direct declarations in the Modern
ethics (Joseph Butler, John Stuart Mill, Henry Sidgwick). Then he draws a picture of how the paradox of
hedonism was turned into the first step of justification of morality. The predicament of a hedonist
generated by the paradox should show him that there are some objective life-goals independent of his
pleasure and pain (the position of Paul Bloomfield and Peter Singer).
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