General Principles of Law: Deduction, Competition, and Balance (from Interpretation to Attributive Features of Constitutional Principles)

Abstract

This paper examines the legal nature of general principles of law, their role in interpreting the law, and filling legal gaps. Drawing on J.-L. Bergel's concept, the paper analyzes the deductive nature of principles, which allows for the derivation of specific normative prescriptions from abstract standards, as well as the fundamental and technical functions of principles. The author that deduction is a necessary but not exhaustive property: principles collide, requiring not the derivation of rules, but rather weighing and balancing. The competition of principles is interpreted as an inherent feature of the legal system, ensuring the coexistence of divergent values. It is proposed to describe compromise in the event of a clash of principles in terms of Pareto efficiency and Nash equilibrium, which characterizes the application of principles as the "art of balance." Additionally, drawing on G.A. Gadzhiev's position, the specific features of the logical structure of principles (absence of disposition, restorative sanction) have been  identified. Based on the analysis, the attributive features of constitutional and legal principles are formulated: ethical foundation, standard status (optimization requirements), absence of direct regulation, atypical logical structure, gradual feasibility, and competition as a source of dynamic equilibrium.