One Aspect of Epistemological Modesty

Abstract

The article discusses one, but very significant, aspect of the position of epistemological modesty. Namely, it is demonstrated that the claim of humanity to possess universal and necessary knowledge, expressed by the corresponding universal and necessary judgments, is, in fact, unfounded. This is achieved through a critical analysis of the positions of those philosophers and representatives of fundamental science who are convinced of the achievability of such – universal – knowledge. The implementation of the corresponding analysis of the a prioriism of I. Kant, panlogism of G. Hegel, the rationalistic version of Christian theism, dialectical materialism and the position of those representatives of fundamental science who hoped for universal knowledge on the way of unlimited extrapolation of existing scientific knowledge, shows that their attempts to justify the possibility of achieving universal knowledge by humanity are based on postulative (unsubstantiated) imposing very strict restrictions on reality. The rejection of such rigid and unjustified ontological restrictions is tantamount to a transition to the position of epistemological modesty and the rejection of hopes for the acquisition of universal and necessary knowledge.